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Constitutional Struggle Over
Telecommunications Regulation
by RITA M. CAIN*

Introduction
Nearly 200 years after the United States Constitution was
ratified, lawmakers still struggle with the delicate balance of
power that the Constitution establishes between the federal
and state governments. For several years, telecommunications
regulation has provided a legal battleground for the states to
square off against federal regulators. In recent years, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has usually prevailed
on claims that federal telecommunications policy and regulation preempted inconsistent state regulations. In 1986, however, the states scored a significant comeback victory in
LouisianaPublicService Commission v. FCC.' In that case, the
Supreme Court reversed an FCC order that outlawed various
state telephone depreciation regulations which conflicted with
FCC depreciation methods and policies. The relevance of the
decision, in light of the recent history of federal preeminence in
telecommunications regulation, is the subject of this article.
Section I of this article discusses the legal bases for federal
preemption of state regulation. Section II examines preemption precedents in telecommunications law. Section III examines the Lousiana Public Service Commission v. FCC decision
in detail. Finally, section IV discusses the immediate economic
impact of that decision as well as its legal impact on other telecommunications preemption issues.
* Assistant Professor of Business Law, Henry W. Bloch School of Business and
Public Administration, University of Missouri at Kansas City; B.A., Rockhurst College, J.D., University of Kansas. The author is an attorney for United TeleSpectrum,
Inc., the mobile communications subsidiary of United Telecommunications, Inc.
1. 106 S. Ct. 1890 (1986).
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I
Federal Supremacy Justifies Preemption
of State Laws
The United States Constitution provides the overarching authority for all federal preemption orders. Under our constitutional system the states are sovereign governments. The
Constitution, however, specifically limits that sovereign state
power in some areas, granting exclusive authority to the federal government.2 In addition to express limitations on state
power, the Constitution prohibits all state laws that conflict
with federal law.3 Most preemption cases are based on a federal claim that otherwise permissible state action conflicts with
federal law and contravenes the Supremacy Clause.4
The problem for lawmakers is determining when state action
conflicts with federal law or policy such that the state law must
be preempted.
A.

Dominant Federal Interest

In certain areas of law, the federal interest may be so pervasive and dominant that federal law must singularly control.
Thus, all state laws in these uniquely federal areas will conflict
with the federal statutory scheme because the federal scheme
is intended to occupy the field of regulation.' Preemption of
state law is a common result.
For example, in Hines v. Davidowitz,6 the Supreme Court
held that the Federal Alien Registration Act of 1940 precluded
2. These exclusive powers include the power to make treaties, to coin currency
and to declare war. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
3. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause reads:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id.
4. In Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), one of the earliest Supreme
Court preemption decisions, the Court held that state laws in conflict with an act of
Congress must yield to the federal law. In Gibbons, the state of New York was prevented from barring a federal navigation licensee from using New York's navigable
waters.
5. See generally 1 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 623 (1986).
6. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
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any state legislation dealing with alien registration.7 In Hines,
the Court specifically denied the state of Pennsylvania authority to enforce its Alien Registration Act of 1939. The Court
stated that the power of the federal government is supreme in
the field of foreign affairs, including immigration, naturalization and deportation.' Since the federal government represents
the interests of all states in the conduct of foreign affairs, no
state "can add to or take from" the force and effect of federal
laws in this area. 9 Only one alien registration law - the federal law - can stand.
Similarly, in Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 1° the Supreme Court
held that the Smith Act of 1940, which prohibited sedition
against the United States, precluded prosecution of such acts
under any parallel state legislation." The Court stated that sedition is a crime against the nation, not a local offense. 2 For
this reason, prosecution for seditious acts must be exclusively
13
within the federal government's control.
In reaching its decision, the Nelson Court noted three factors
that mandate exclusive federal regulation in any given area.
First, the scheme of federal legislation may be so pervasive that
one may reasonably infer that "Congress left no room for the
states to supplement it."' 4 Second, the federal interest in a subject may be so dominant that it can be "assumed to preclude
enforcement of state laws on the same subject.' 15 Finally, even
consistent, parallel state legislation can hamper uniform federal enforcement or administration. Pennsylvania's sedition
prosecutions were viewed as potentially conflicting legislation
and were invalidated.'
In a recent "dominant interest" case, White Mountain
7 the Supreme
Apache Tribe v. Bracker,1
Court denied the state
of Arizona authority to impose motor carrier and fuel taxes on
non-Indian entities transporting timber on an Arizona Indian
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id. at 73-74.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 63.
350 U.S. 497 (1956).
Id. at 509.
12. Id. at 505.

13. Id.
14. Id. at 502 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
15. Id. at 504 (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230).
16. Id. at 506.

17. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
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reservation. The Court noted the strong historical federal interest in promoting Indian tribal self-governance. 8 Further,
the Court cited several examples of the comprehensive nature
of federal regulations governing harvest, sale, and management
of tribal timber.' 9 It held, "[t]here is no room for these taxes in
the comprehensive regulatory scheme. '"20
Thus, White Mountain illustrates that the Hines and Nelson
rationales still apply today, even in cases not involving foreign
policy or national security. State economic legislation can be
invalidated in the face of a dominant federal interest and pervasive federal regulation.
B.

Federal Preemption Despite Shared Federal and State Power

In Nelson,2 ' the Supreme Court noted that its decision did
not call for preemption when Congress had given the states and
the federal government concurrent jurisdiction in an area.22
However, preemption is sometimes mandated even though a
federal statute may provide for, or permit, joint regulation.23 In
these cases, the state's exercise of its statutory authority has
been deemed inconsistent with the federal regulatory response.
Either compliance with both state and federal law is impossible 24 or the state's regulation contravenes federal objectives,
notwithstanding the federal statutory enabling language intended to permit concurrent state regulation.25 In either case,
18. Id. at 144.
19. Id. at 145-47.
20. Id. at 148.
21. See supra note 10.
22. Nelson, 350 U.S. at 500. See also supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
23. See generally 1 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, supra note 5, at 623.
24. See, e.g., Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School Dist., 469 U.S. 256 (1985).
A South Dakota statute required local governments to spend funds from the Payment in Lieu of Taxes Act in a particular way. The Supreme Court held that the state
law limiting discretion conflicted with the federal law that provided more flexibility
to the local governments. Thus, the federal statute preempted the state law despite
the intent of the federal law to allow state regulation.
25. See Michigan Canners and Freezers Ass'n v. Agricultural Marketing and
Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461 (1984). The Michigan Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Act was held inconsistent with the intent and purpose of the Federal Agricultural Fair Practices Act. Although both statutes had the stated purpose of insulating
agricultural producers from coercion by processors and producers associations, the
Michigan statute established a state-administered system of exclusive, organized and
certified bargaining agents for produce. The Court held that the state-accredited
agent could have the same coercive effect on producers that the federal statute prohibits. Thus, the Michigan statute circumvented federal protection and was stricken
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the contrary state law must yield to the letter or spirit of the
federal law.
The Communications Act of 193426 establishes concurrent
state and federal jurisdiction over telecommunications. Despite the shared regulatory authority, state and federal telecommunications regulators have repeatedly clashed over the
extent of their respective power. Thus, telecommunications
regulation has been fertile ground for federal preemption law.

II
Telecommunications Preemption: Pre-Louisiana
Public Service Commission
A.

The Good Old Days

When Congress passed the Communications Act of 1934,27 it
created the FCC. The FCC assumed the telephone regulatory
authority formerly vested in the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) and replaced the Federal Radio Commission as
the federal regulator of the radio spectrum.2 8
One purpose of the Communications Act of 1934 was to address the federal-state ratemaking conflict concerning the
Shreveport Doctrine which had emerged out of Houston, East
and West Texas Railway v. United States,2 9 better known as the
Shreveport Rate Case. In Shreveport, the Supreme Court held
that the ICC could regulate rates of strictly intrastate shippers
if the intrastate rates unreasonably discriminated against interstate shippers who charged ICC-imposed rates.3 ° Thus, under
the Shreveport Doctrine, federal regulators could investigate
and alter rates of strictly local service providers upon a finding
of discriminatory intrastate rates.
Although the ICC never imposed a Shreveport-type ruling
against a state utility commission in dealing with rates of a local
as inconsistent, even though the federal statute indicated no intent to occupy the field

of agricultural product marketing. Id. at 477-78.
26. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976).
27. Id.
28. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976); McKenna, Preemption Under the CommunicationsAct,
37 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 12-13 (1985).
29. 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
30. Id. at 358. In Shreveport, a Texas regulatory commission had established intrastate shipping rates for Texas carriers that undercut ICC rates imposed upon Louisiana carriers shipping in Texas. The Court held that the Texas intrastate regulation
was immune from federal scrutiny only to the extent that the intrastate rates did not
unreasonably discriminate against interstate commerce.
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communications provider, the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) urged the 1934 Congress
to address and eliminate the Shreveport Doctrine in the Communications Act of 1934.31
The resulting legislation attempted to reconcile the federal
regulatory goal of uniform, nationwide radio and wire communications systems with the state regulatory objective that local
subscribers receive quality service at reasonable rates. To meet
these dual ends, the Act delegates certain powers to the FCC
and leaves other powers strictly in the hands of state
regulators.
For example, the FCC must "make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States, a rapid, efficient, nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication
service."3 2 The Commission executes this appointed task by
granting licenses 33 establishing technical standards 34 and policing licensees for technical and procedural compliance.35
On the other hand, the Commission is expressly denied jurisdiction over "charges, classifications, practices, services, facilities, or regulations for or in connection with intrastate
communication service. ' 36 Thus, the states have complete authority over in-state facilities and practices of their local service
providers, and over rates paid by their constituents.
Within this legislative framework, state and federal telecommunciations regulators have tackled their appointed tasks.
During the era of non-competitive telephone service prior to
the 1960s, state and federal regulatory objectives were consis31. See McKenna, Preemption Under the Communications Act, 37 FED. COMM.
L.J. 1, 13 n.34 (1985) (citing Regulation of Interstate and Foreign Communicationsby
Wire or Radio: Hearingson S. 2910 Before the Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 73rd
Cong., 2d Sess. 180 (1934) (testimony of General Solicitor Benton, Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'n); Regulation of Interstateand Foreign Communicationsby Wire
or Radio, andfor Other Purposes:Hearings on HR. 8301 Before the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1934) (testimony of General
Solicitor Benton, Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'n)).
32. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
33. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 214, 301 (1976) (section 214 requires a carrier to obtain a
"certificate" from the FCC).
34. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 305 (1976).
35. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 208 (1976).
36. 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (1976).
37. Other areas in which the states are left some discretion include valuation of a
local carrier's property, 47 U.S.C. § 213(h) (1976), and regulation of facilities in a local
service area that straddles a state boundary line, 47 U.S.C. § 221(a). See, e.g., New
York Telephone Co. v. FCC, 631 F.2d 1059, 1064-65 (2d Cir. 1980).
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tent and regulators were not at jurisdictional odds.3 However,
in the 1960s the FCC sought to make telecommunications services, including telephone service, competitive. At the same
time, cable television regulation presented new "state versus
federal" challenges.39 The stage was set for the preemption
battles to follow.
B.

The FCC's Winning Record
1.

Cable TV and the Telephone Connection

In 1968, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the FCC's
decision to regulate cable television signals in United States v.
Southwestern Cable Co. 40 Southwestern Cable Company had

sought to avoid federal regulation on the grounds that it operated only intrastate facilities, over which the FCC is denied
jurisdiction.4
The Supreme Court soundly rejected this interpretation of
the FCC's authority. First, it noted that cable providers retransmit "communications that have very often originated in
other States. '42 For this reason, the activities at issue were not
intrastate. On a more fundamental level, the Court emphasized
the FCC's "broad authority" and "comprehensive mandate"
granted by the 1934 Congress. 43 Regulation of cable TV, the
Court said, is "reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission's various responsibilities."44
Following this decision, the FCC exercised jurisdiction over
the services local telephone companies provide to cable TV
companies. In General Telephone Co. of Californiav. FCC,45 in
an opinion by then-Judge Warren Burger, the D.C. Circuit affirmed an FCC order requiring FCC certification of channel
service that telephone companies provided to cable companies.
38. McKenna, supra note 28, at 2.
39. Id. at 2-3.
40. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
41. 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (1976). In Southwestern Cable, the FCC was not preempting
any allegedly conflicting state regulation. The Commission, however, was exercising

jurisdiction that the cable provider alleged was denied the FCC by section 152(b). 392
U.S. at 169 n.29. Southwestern Cable, and other cases in which the FCC asserts its
authority to license, reflect the same statutory authority arguments proffered by the
states in preemption cases.
42. Southwestern Cable, 392 U.S. at 169.
43. Id. at 172-73.
44. Id. at 178.
45. 413 F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 888 (1969).
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The federal certificate was required even when the telephone
facilities were entirely within a single state. Burger relied on
the Supreme Court's decision in Southwestern Cable in holding
that the telephone companies' service offerings to the cable
providers made the telephone companies "an integral part of
interstate broadcast transmissions. 4' 6 Further, the court felt
that federal regulation was necessary and was within the Commission's authority under the Act, stating that "fifty states and
myriad local authorities cannot effectively deal with bits and
'47
pieces of what is really a unified system of communications.
With these favorable opinions under its belt, the Commission
began to implement a policy of injecting competition into the
previously monopolized telecommunications fields. In 1975,
the Commission promulgated rules prohibiting each telephone
company and its affiliates from providing cable TV service in
the telephone company's local service area.4" In General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. United States,4 9 the Fifth Circuit
agreed with the Commission's argument that the telephone
companies' control over phone poles and conduits allowed the
telephone companies to hinder cable competition by denying or
50
delaying a competitor's access to those critical connections.
The court held that the Commission's statutory authority, to
provide a nationwide telephone service and to issue licenses for
the public convenience and necessity, gave the Commission
"ample jurisdiction" to prohibit telephone companies from offering cable TV service in their local service areas.5 '
In General Telephone Co. of the Southwest, the court did not
deem the FCC action contrary to section 152(b) of the Communciations Act of 1934, which denies the Commission jurisdiction over intrastate facilities and services.5 2 Relying on
Southwestern Cable, the court upheld FCC action as permissible regulation of interstate communications, even though the
cable TV service the telephone companies sought to offer
would be strictly local.5 3
Although General Telephone Co. of the Southwest denied the
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 401.
Id.
47 C.F.R. § 63.54-57 (1975).
449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1971).
Id. at 854.
Id.
Id. at 855.
rd.
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telephone companies authority to enter the cable TV market,
the rationale was a pro-competition one: to insure against telephone company monopolization of essential facilities. The FCC
subsequently began preempting various state regulations that
protected telephone company monopolies, in order to promote
competition in areas previously within the telephone companies' exclusive domain.
2.

Telephone equipment: NCUC I

In 1969, the FCC opened the field of customer premises
equipment (CPE) to competition. 4 Previously, all telephones
and related equipment had been provided by the local telephone company. The Commission invalidated various telephone company rules which prohibited use of non-telephone
company equipment with the telephone company service.5 5
In 1973, the FCC issued a declaratory order preempting the
states' authority to regulate against non-telephone company
CPE by virtue of discriminatory interconnection rules.5 6 As authority for the preemption, the FCC asserted that telephone
equipment must be connected to the national telephone system
because it "is used in common and indivisibly for all local and
long distance telephone calls. '5 7 Thus, any state regulation
that denied non-telephone company equipment interconnection to the system impinged on the federal power to provide a
nationwide system.
The North Carolina Utilities Commission (NCUC) appealed
the preemption order, but the Fourth Circuit affirmed in North
Carolina Utilities Commission v. FCC (NCUCI)."8 The Fourth
Circuit established an expansive view of FCC power, despite
the section 152(b) limitation on federal jurisdiction. According
to the court, "the purpose of [section 152(b)] is to restrain the
54. CPE is terminal telephone equipment at the customer's place of operation,

such as a basic handset, data sets and teletypewriters. Other telephone equipment
includes switching equipment at the customer's place of business, such as a private
branch exchange (PBX), and switching equipment at the telephone company's central
office. See Note, Competition in the Telephone Equipment Industry: Beyond Telerent,
86 YALE L.J. 538 n.1 (1976).
55. See, e.g., Carterfone, Decision, 13 F.C.C.2d 420, recon. denied, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 14 F.C.C.2d 571 (1968).
56. Telerent Leasing Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 45 F.C.C.2d 204
(1974), aff'd, North Carolina Util. Comm'n v. FCC, 537 F.2d 787 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1027 (1976).
57. Telerent, 45 F.C.C.2d at para. 26.
58. 537 F.2d 737, 792 (4th Cir. 1976).
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Commission from interfering with those essentially local incidents and practices of common carriage by wire that do not substantially encroach upon the administration and development
of the interstate telephone network."5 9 Further, the court
stated that section 152(b) only limits the Commission's jurisdiction regarding services and facilities "that in their nature and
effect are separable from and do not substantially affect the
conduct or development of interstate communications."6
Under this analysis, all policies and regulations regarding telephone equipment affect interstate commerce because all telephone equipment may be used for both local and out-of-state
long distance calling.
Accordingly, the court held that the FCC has jurisdiction
over all facilities except those that do not "substantially affect"
or encroach upon the interstate network. 61 The language of
section 152 denies the FCC jurisdiction over intrastate facilities.
In applying that language in NCUC I, however, the Fourth Circuit effectively established a presumption that all facilities are
interstate facilities (and within FCC jurisdiction) unless states
or local service providers prove the facilities do not substantially affect interstate facilities.6 2 With that burden of proof
placed upon local regulators, the stage was set for the FCC to
preempt many state regulations regarding communications facilities and services that "substantially affect" the national telephone or radio network.
C.

Post NCUC I

Relying on NCUC I, the FCC began to implement its procompetition policy on common carrier services. 3 In California
59. Id. at 794 n.6.
60. Id. at 793.
61. Id. The court noted that "rate making [sic] typifies those activities of the telephone industry which lend themselves to practical separation of the local from the
interstate in such a way that local regulation of one does not interfere with national
regulation of the other." Id. at 793 n.6. The local nature of ratemaking ultimately was
critical to the reversal the FCC suffered in Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n. See infra
notes 105-34 and accompanying text.
62. 537 F.2d at 792.
63. The Communications Act of 1934 defines a common carrier as "any person
engaged as a common carrier for hire, in interstate or foreign communication by wire
or radio." 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1987). The FCC rules add the following: "[A]ny person
engaged in rendering communication service for hire to the public." 47 C.F.R. § 21.1
(1987). Courts have given additional guidance, finding common carriers where the
activity is of a "quasi-public" nature, National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'n v.
FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 640 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied. 425 U.S. 992 (1976), or where the
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v. FCC,6 4 the California Public Utilities Commission (PUC) and
the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners
challenged the FCC's authority to license and regulate foreign
exchange and common control switching arrangement carriers
and facilities6 5 that operate both interstate and intrastate. Specifically, plaintiffs challenged the FCC's grant of operating authority to Southern Pacific Communications Company,
allowing it to provide foreign exchange and common control
switching arrangement service. Southern Pacific had asked the
PUC for authority to provide the service locally in California.
Such service would have competed with the intrastate long distance service offered by AT&T and Pacific Telephone and Telegraph, California's Bell System affiliate. The PUC granted
Southern Pacific limited interim authority, 66 but when Southern Pacific sought necessary interconnection from Pacific Telephone,6 7 Pacific Telephone sought guidance from the California
PUC. Southern Pacific sought protective rulings from the
FCC.
The FCC concluded that its section 151 licensing jurisdiction
clearly permitted it to grant Southern Pacific interstate authority.68 Since the Southern Pacific facilities would be used for
both interstate and intrastate communications that would be
"technically and practically difficult" to separate, the FCC concluded that it had jurisdiction to regulate Southern Pacific's intrastate operations. 69 The regulatory protection the Bell
Company sought from the PUC to avoid competition from
Southern Pacific would be inconsistent with the FCC's authority. Additionally, any protective ruling for Pacific Telephone
activity is undertaken for profit, AT&T v. FCC, 572 F.2d 17, 26 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,

439 U.S. 875 (1978). See also Frieden, The Computer Inquiries:Mappinq the Communications/InformationProcessing Terrain, 33 FED. COMM. L.J. 55 (1981).
64. 567 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1010 (1978).
65. Foreign exchange allows a person to maintain a local phone in multiple service areas. Calls between these phones, then, are local calls, not long distance. Common control switching arrangement permits multiple offices (and phones) of a single
customer to be linked through a telephone company switch so that calls between the
various offices are local, not long distance. California v. FCC, 567 F.2d at 87 n.2.
66. Id. at 88.
67. If Southern Pacific's private systems could not be interconnected to the rest of
the nationwide telephone system through the local Bell affiliate, the private system
users could never call outside the private system. Interconnection by AT&T and Bell
System affiliates for other common carriers is mandatory. See, e.g., AT&T, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 52 F.C.C.2d 727 (1978).
68. AT&T, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 56 F.C.C.2d 14, para. 24 (1975).
69. Id. at para. 16.
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would violate FCC precedents that require Bell companies to
provide interconnection for "other common carriers."7 For
these reasons, the FCC ruled in favor of Southern Pacific in all
respects, establishing it as a long distance competitor in the
region.
In a rather terse five-paragraph opinion that relied heavily
on NCUC I, the D.C. Circuit affirmed.7 ' The court stated that
the FCC's interconnection authority and interstate licensing jurisdiction gave it the power to establish competition between
the "other common carriers" and the formerly72monopolistic
telephone companies for long distance revenues.
Following this expansion of jurisdiction, the Commission attempted to promote competition in the telecommunications industry by permitting resale and shared use of interstate private
7
line services, 73 and resale of interstate toll service and WATS. 1
In each case, the Commission outlawed such resale and shared
use restrictions that formerly existed in tariffs filed with the
FCC or state commissions. 75 Additionally, the FCC rejected arguments of state utility commissions from California, Michigan,
Kansas, and Alabama and preempted restrictions on "physically intrastate" WATS based on the interstate nature of the
service offered, rather than on the location of the physical
link.76
The final significant FCC jurisdiction victory came in 1982, in
70. Id. at 20-21.
71. California v. FCC, 567 F.2d at 87.
72. Although the proceedings were completely separate, the FCC's pro-competition policy in long distance and other areas was consistent with the Department of
Justice's action against AT&T that resulted in the divestiture from AT&T of Bell
System companies. Divestiture has resulted in the appearance of many new long distance service providers. See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
73. Resale and Shared Use of Common Services, Report and Order, 60 F.C.C.2d
261 (1976), Memorandum Opinion and Order, 62 F.C.C.2d 588 (1977), aff'd sub nom.
AT&T v. FCC, 572 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 875 (1978).
The FCC described resale as "subscription to communications services and facilities
by one entity and reoffering of communications and facilities to the public (with or
without "adding value") for profit." 60 F.C.C.2d at para. 4. The Commission explained
that an end-user may seek out a reseller, who combines the needs of many end-user
customers to purchase bulk discount service that an individual end-user could never
access. 60 F.C.C.2d at paras. 19-20.
Shared use is a non-profit arrangement in which members collectively use facilities
and share the cost on a pro-rata basis, thus saving the individuals investment costs in
equipment that would have extensive unused capacity. 60 F.C.C.2d at paras. 23-24.
74. Resale and Shared Use, Report and Order, 83 F.C.C.2d 167 (1980).
75. Id. at paras. 11-13.
76. See AT&T, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 94 F.C.C.2d 1110 (1983).

1987]

TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION

the proceeding known as the Second Computer Inquiry, or
Computer 11.7' In Computer II, the FCC sought to clarify the
fuzzy technological distinction that had developed between
computerized data processing, which was deregulated, and computerized communications services, which were regulated. To
accomplish this purpose, the Commission abandoned the distinction. Henceforth, according to the FCC order, the only distinction would be between basic transmission service, which
would be regulated, and enhanced service and customer premises equipment (CPE), which would be deregulated. 8
To facilitate deregulation of CPE, the FCC "unbundled" CPE
from basic service "by discontinuing rate regulation of CPE and
ordering that CPE be sold separately from basic communications service in a competitive market. ' ' 79 Further, to ensure that
its dichotomized regulatory scheme would be nationally uniform, the Commission preempted all state regulation of en80
hanced services and CPE.
According to the Commission, preemption was permissible
because the now-deregulated CPE was being used for interstate, as well as intrastate, communications. Preemption was
77. Second Computer Inquiry, Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980), Memorandum Opinion and Order, reconsideration,84 F.C.C.2d 50 (1980), further reconsideration, 88 F.C.C.2d 512 (1981), aff'd sub nom. Computer and Communications Indus.
Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982). In the FirstComputer Inquiry, or Computer I, the FCC established rules regarding use of computers by common carriers for
data processing versus use in the common carriers' communication services, such as
message or circuit switching. Computer Use of Communications Facilities, Final Decision and Order, 28 F.C.C.2d 267 (1971), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. GTE
Service Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1973). Data processing services were ordered deregulated in Computer II while computerized communications remained
regulated.
78. 77 F.C.C.2d at paras. 92-97. Enhanced service is any service other than basic
service. Enhanced service "combines basic service with computer processing applications that act on the format, content, code, protocol or similar aspects of the subscriber's transmitted information, or provide the subscriber additional, different, or
restructured information, or involve subscriber interaction with stored information."
Id. at para. 5. "An example of enhanced service is AT&T's Dial It service, whereby
subscribers dial a certain number to gain access to stored information such as scores of
professional sports contests." Computer and Communications Indus. Ass'n v. FCC,
693 F.2d 198, 205 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also Computer II Reconsideration Decision,
84 F.C.C.2d at 55, paras. 13-14 (1981).
79. Computer and CommunicationsIndus. Assn., 693 F.2d at 205 (Second Computer Inquiry, Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, para. 12 (1980)).
80. Second Computer Inquiry, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 84 F.C.C.2d 50,
para. 155 (1980), further reconsideration,88 F.C.C.2d 512, paras. 35, 85 (1981). The
preemption order required that providers remove charges for the enhanced services
and customer premises equipment from tariffs filed with local utility commissions.
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necessary because a federal deregulation program cannot work
if states continue to regulate enhanced services and CPE as adjuncts of basic service."'
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit fully affirmed the FCC actions.8 2
The court noted that the Commission's broad licensing authority over all interstate wire and radio communications gave it
jurisdiction over enhanced services and CPE. 3 Further, the
court agreed with the Commission's finding that enhanced
services and CPE are not "common carrier" services under the
Communications Act of 1934.84 Under either of these reasons,
the court believed the FCC's decision to deregulate sale of
these services was "sustainable."8 5 The FCC could forbear regulating these services because they could not be identified as
common carrier services requiring regulation under the Act.
The court also found that the FCC had authority to determine
that competition in the sale of these services renders regulation
unnecessary.8 6
The courts soundly rejected arguments that the FCC lacked
jurisdiction to preempt state regulation of CPE. The state of
California and NARUC complained that the cost of CPE traditionally had been apportioned between intrastate and interstate use, with the intrastate portion being reflected in local
telephone rates. They contended that any departure from the
scheme violated section 152(b) of the Act, which reserves jurisdiction of intrastate rates, classifications and services exclusively to the states.8 7
Relying on NCUC 1,88 the court rejected the local regulators'
claims, and held that "state regulation which impedes a federal
regulatory goal must yield to the federal scheme. '8 9 The FCC
had concluded that a pro-competitive CPE market would best
promote an efficient, nationwide telecommunications network.
"When charges for CPE are bundled into transmission charges,
81. Second Computer Inquiry, 88 F.C.C.2d at para. 83 n.34.
82. 693 F.2d at 220. The State of California and National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners were both appellants. The Louisiana Public Service Commission was an intervenor. Id. at 198.
83. Id. at 207-08.
84. Id. at 209.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 214.
87. Id.
88. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
89. Computer and Communications Indus. Assn., 693 F.2d at 215.
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. the benefits of a competitive market are partially lost because consumers' freedom of choice is limited."9 The only way
to give consumers a valid choice of CPE, the FCC decided, was
to sever CPE charges from transmission charges on both federal and state levels. The court agreed.9 '
The states attempted to distinguish NCUC I from this rationale. CPE tariffing directly impacted the states' ratemaking
function, whereas the NCUC I ruling, that non-telephone company equipment be given fair interconnection, did not.92 Furthermore, section 152(b) was specifically intended to preserve
the states' exclusive local ratemaking role, in response to the
ShreveportRate Case.93 Thus, the states contended, preemption
of local CPE tariffing violated the fundamental purpose of section 152(b) in a way that the NCUC I interconnection-related
rulings did not.
The court disagreed. It held that the deregulation of CPE
used in interstate communications did not amount to federal
ratemaking for intrastate communications service in violation
of section 152(b). The court stated that preemption principles
do not apply less to states' ratemaking authority than to other
state authority. Rather, preemption is justified whenever conflicting local regulation frustrates validly adopted federal
94
policy.
While the FCC was receiving such overwhelming approval of
its actions from the D.C. Circuit, the Commission was also issuing its depreciation preemption orders, which the Supreme
Court would eventually reverse in Louisiana Public Service
Commission.9
*

.

90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 27-37 and accompanying text.
94. Computer and Communications Indus. Assn., 693 F.2d at 216. The states'
ratemaking authority was ultimately the basis of the Supreme Court's reversal of the
FCC's depreciation preemption order in Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n. See infra
notes 98-125 and accompanying text. The distinction between the states' ratemaking
authority, given by section 152(b), and all other regulatory authority was critical in
the FCC's radio paging cases. See infra notes 153-74 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 1.
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III
The States Win A Comeback Victory: Louisiana
Public Service Commission v. Federal
Communications Commission
A.

FCC Orders Regarding Depreciation of Telephone Property

The Louisiana Public Service Commission litigation had a
somewhat capricious beginning at the FCC. In 1980, the FCC
changed two telephone depreciation practices. 96 First, for depreciation purposes, the Commission permitted telephone companies to group telephone plant costs according to estimated
service life.97 Previously, telephone plant costs had to be classified and depreciated according to year of installation. The
change was intended to more accurately match capital recovery
with capital consumption.98
Second, the 1980 Report and Order mandated "remaining
life" depreciation, as opposed to "whole life" accounting. According to the FCC, the remaining life method would permit
erroneous depreciation estimates to be corrected in midcourse,
assuring full recovery of the asset cost.99
In 1981, the FCC introduced a regulation that required labor
and material costs for inside wiring of a home or business to be
expensed in the year incurred. 100 Formerly, these costs were
depreciated over time as capital investments. NARUC petitioned the FCC to clarify the inside wiring depreciation order,
maintaining that the order did not preclude state commissions
from employing different depreciation practices in their states.
Over the objections of two dissenters, the FCC concluded that
its depreciation orders did not preclude state regulators "from
using other accounting or depreciation procedures for intrastate ratemaking purposes."' 1 1 The Commission examined the
relevant sections of the Communications Act of 1934 and found
that the Act did not require state commissions to adhere to federal depreciation requirements. 2 The dissenters argued that
96. Property Depreciation, Report and Order, 83 F.C.C.2d 267 (1980), reconsid.

denied, 87 F.C.C.2d 916 (1981).
97. 83 F.C.C.2d at para. 2.
98. Id. at paras. 2-3.
99. Id. at paras. 76-84.
100. Uniform Systems of Accounts, Report and Order, 85 F.C.C.2d 818 (1981).
101. Uniform Systems of Accounts, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 89 F.C.C.2d
1094, para. 3 (1982), reconsidered, 92 F.C.C.2d 864 (1983).
102. 89 F.C.C.2d at para. 8.
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preemption of inconsistent state depreciation practices was
both intentional and appropriate. °3 The FCC was moving the
telecommunications industry into the "brave new world" of
competition with these depreciation orders. Conflicting state
depreciation practices encouraged the monopoly status quo,
10 4
contrary to the FCC's pro-competitive policy.
One year later, on a petition for reconsideration, the FCC reversed its decision and followed the lead of previously dissenting Commissioners Fogerty and Jones." 5 The Commission held
that section 220(b) of the Communications Act of 1934,06 which
addresses depreciation, gives the Commission primary authority over depreciation practices. Accordingly, conflicting state
depreciation policies were preempted by the section 220(b) delegation of authority to the federal regulators.1 0 7 Alternatively,
the Commission held that its displacement of conflicting state
depreciation regulation was necessary to prevent valid federal
policy from being frustrated by state policies that did not adequately provide for capital recovery in competitive environments. "State depreciation rate prescriptions . . . would
frustrate the accomplishment of that policy [competition] and
10 8
are preemptable by this Commission."
Twenty-four state utilities commissions appealed the reconsideration order in their respective federal circuits. 0 9 The
Fourth Circuit affirmed the FCC order. 10 The court did not analyze whether section 220 preempts state depreciation rules
that conflict with federal depreciation regulations. Relying on
NCUC I, the court affirmed the preemption order because the
FCC could preempt any regulation it concluded would frustrate
federal policy.1 1' The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 2
103. Id. at 1109 (Fogarty and Jones, dissenting).
104. Id. at 1111.
105. Amendment of Part 31, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 92 F.C.C.2d 864
(1983).
106. 47 U.S.C. § 220(b) (1976).
107. 92 F.C.C.2d at paras. 13-17.
108. Id. at para. 33.
109. See 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1) (1976) (The statute gives the court of appeals exclusive
jurisdiction over appeals of final FCC orders.).
110. Virginia State Corps. Comm'n v. FCC, 737 F.2d 388 (4th Cir. 1984).
111. Id. at 392.
112. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 106 S. Ct. 1890 (1985). Originally, the
Louisiana Public Service Commission appealed its case to the Supreme Court, rather
than moving for review by petition for certiorari. After the Court granted certiorari
petitions, the Louisiana Public Service Commission asked that its appellate jurisdic-
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The States Finally Persuade the Highest Court
to Their Position

B.

Justice Brennan wrote the Louisiana Public Service Commission majority opinion, in which Justices White, Marshall,
Rehnquist and Stevens joined. 1 13 Contrary to the Fourth
Circuit's approach, the Supreme Court examined only the statutory scheme regarding federal regulation of depreciation
methods in determining whether the Communications Act permitted concurrent state depreciation requirements. The Court
did not assess the wisdom of any FCC pro-competition policy,
nor did it determine which practices would best effectuate
those policies." 4 Despite the FCC claim that state depreciation
practices were thwarting legitimate federal policy, the
Supreme Court held that the Communications Act denied the
Commission authority to dictate depreciation regulations to the
states." 5
1.

Section 151 versus Section 152(b)

The petitioners successfully argued that the language of section 152(b) of the Act specifically denies the FCC authority
over depreciation regulation." 6 They stated that section 152(b)
gives the states exclusive authority over depreciation methods
because depreciation methods directly impact and play an integral role in establishing "charges" and "classifications" for local
telephone service." 7
The FCC and its supporting intervenors were also armed
with statutory language which, they argued, gave the Commission exclusive jurisdiction over depreciation regulation. The
respondents argued that, pursuant to section 151, the FCC
could preempt any state regulations that have the effect of hintion statement be treated as a certiorari petition, and the Court agreed. See id. at 1896
n.2.
113. Justices Powell and O'Connor took no part in the case. Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Blackmun dissented without opinion.
114. 106 S. Ct. at 1894.
115. Id. at 1894-95.
116. The critical limiting language of 47 U.S.C. section 152(b) reads:
Subject to the provisions of section 301 of this title, nothing in this chapter
shall be construed to apply or to give the Commission jurisdiction with respect to... charges, classifications, practices, services, facilities or regulations
for or in connection with intrastate communication service by wire or radio
of any carrier ....
47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (1976).
117. 106 S. Ct. at 1897.
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dering federal telecommunications policies, because section 151
confers broad authority to effectuate a nationwide communications system on the Commission. This argument relied on the
FCC's successful preemption precedents, such as NCUC I and
Computer 11.118 In this case, the FCC claimed that the state depreciation regulations hindered competition in the telephone
industry, contrary to the FCC's policy that competition will
benefit the industry and its users. For these reasons, the Commission argued, contradictory state depreciation rules could not
stand.
a.

Depreciation as "Ratemaking" Under Section 152(b)

The Supreme Court first discussed how depreciation affects
telephone rates. The Court explained that depreciation is integral to the state ratemaking function:
The total amount that a carrier is entitled to charge for services, its "revenue requirement," is the sum of its current operating expenses, including taxes and depreciation expenses, and
a return on its investment "rate base" . . . .In the telephone
industry, which is extremely capital intensive, depreciation
charges constitute a significant portion
of the annual revenue
11 9
requirement recovered in rates ....
Various accounting methods alter depreciation expense,
which, in turn, alters rates charged to local telephone users.
The Supreme Court agreed with the petitioners' argument that
section 152(b) gives exclusive ratemaking power to the states.
Thus, federal depreciation mandates impact rates and denies
the states their statutory autonomy regarding local rate120
making.
The FCC countered that the section 152(b) language of
"rates," "classifications," and "charges" refers only to the
charges imposed on customers for services, not to depreciation
charges. Accordingly, section 152(b) would not limit FCC
power to regulate depreciation. 2 '
The Court rejected the FCC's narrow reading of section
152(b) and looked instead to industry practice, and to the FCC's
own use of the words "charges," "classifications," and "prac118.
119.
120.
121.

See supra notes 47-83 and accompanying text.
106 S. Ct. at 1896-97.
Id. at 1899.
Id. at 1899-1900.
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tices.'1 2 2 Ample authority indicated that those terms are used

to denote depreciation practices and charges for the utility rate
base, not just practices and charges regarding customer services. 12 3 The FCC's proffered interpretation of the language at
issue would ignore realities of industry ratemaking practices.
The Court further noted the broad language of the Act:
"[N]othing in this Chapter shall be construed to apply or to give
the Commission jurisdiction with respect to ... charges ... in
connection with intrastate communication service ....,"24 The

Court read the language of the Act broadly and said it "contains
not only a substantive jurisdictional limitation on the FCC's
power, but also a rule of statutory construction. 1

25

Section

152(b) is not limited to rates that providers charge customers
for services.126
The Court also rejected the FCC's argument that the states'
authority under section 152(b) should be confined to intrastate
regulation that is separable from and does not substantially affect interstate communications. 27 The FCC argued that state
depreciation practices impede recovery of plant investment and
telephone companies are discouraged from 8new investment, to
12
the detriment of the nationwide network.
The Court held that the FCC has been denied power to act in
any way regarding intrastate ratemaking and, thus, the FCC
does not have the power to preempt state regulation in the area
of "depreciation practices for intrastate ratemaking purposes.129 The FCC cannot create power for itself when Congress expressly has denied it that power, even when the FCC's
purpose is to effectuate legitimate federal policy.
b.

Section 151 Does Not Justify Preemption

The FCC's second argument relied on its broad authority
conferred by section 151. The Fourth Circuit had deferred to
the FCC's general licensing and policymaking authority when
it affirmed preemption of state depreciation practices. The
122. Id. at 1900.
123. Id.

124. 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (1976). For the pertinent language of the section, see supra
note 116.
125. 106 S. Ct. at 1901.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION

1987]

FCC and its supporting intervenors argued before the Supreme
Court that state depreciation regulations frustrate the FCC's
goal of ensuring competitive, nationwide telephone service.1 3 °
However inclined it might be to find broad FCC powers
based on section 151, the Supreme Court held that it could not
affirm preemption based on a broad policymaking argument.
The specific limitation on FCC jurisdiction found in section
152(b) precluded holding for the Commission based on its general licensing authority. Section 152(b) specifically denies the
FCC jurisdiction in areas such as intrastate ratemaking, of
which depreciation is an integral part.131 The Court stated that
its reading of section 152(b) was supported by the rule of statutory construction that statute sections should be interpreted to
avoid a conflict. 3 2 The Court's reading "naturally reconciled"
sections 151 and 152(b), to articulate a national goal of creating
a rapid, efficient telephone system and "enact[ing] a dual regulatory system to achieve that goal."' 3 3
Even if sections 151 and 152(b) could not be reconciled in this
case, the Court stated that it would not be inclined to favor the
section articulating a general statutory purpose (section 151)
over one which specifically "defines the jurisdictional reach of
the agency formed to implement that purpose. "134
For these reasons, the Court held that section 152(b), not section 151, controlled the outcome. The FCC does not have the
power to preempt state depreciation regulations based on its
broad licensing authority. The states are given exclusive
ratemaking authority, of which depreciation is an integral part.
2.

Section 220 Does Not Occupy the Field
of DepreciationRegulation

Section 220(b) directs the FCC to prescribe classes of property for which depreciation charges may be included under "operating expenses" when the service provider sets rates.'3 5 The
section also prohibits telephone companies from departing
from these classifications and from allocating depreciation of
any other property to operating expense. The FCC argued that
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
47

at 1898-99.
at 1899.
(emphasis in original).
U.S.C. § 220(b) (1982).
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section 220 proves that Congress intended the Commission's depreciation regulations to occupy the field of depreciation regulation, thus preempting any conflicting state depreciation rates
or practices. 36 The FCC also asserted that, in a construction of
section 220 and section 152(b), specific sections should prevail
over general ones. Section 220 specifically deals with depreciation. Section 152(b) should not bar FCC regulation of deprecia7
tion in light of the specific section 220 depreciation rule.1
The Court rejected this argument on two grounds. First, the
Court noted that section 152(b) deals with jurisdiction and section 220 deals with depreciation. Although section 152(b) is
more "general" than section 220, the sections are not general or
38
specific relative to the same subject matter or to each other.
Second, section 152(b) states its own rule of statutory construction which would apply to the construction of the Act in
lieu of any standard canon of construction. Section 152(b)
states that nothing (presumably including section 220) shall be
construed to give the FCC the power it sought. 39 This language precludes any other statutory interpretation that would
give the FCC jurisdiction.
Section 220 is captioned "Accounts, records and memoranda." The Court considered it "plausible," as the petitioners'
argued, that section 220 gives the FCC authority over the carriers, bookkeeping practices, including depreciation recordation,
so that investors and regulators can get an accurate picture of
the carriers' financial health. 40 Whatever its full scope, the
Court held that section 220 does not occupy the field of depreci41
ation regulation so as to justify preemption.'
The Court also noted that the Communications Act "contains
some internal inconsistencies, vague language and areas of uncertainty.'' 42 The contentions of the parties did not perfectly

fit into this statutory puzzle. For purposes of intrastate
ratemaking, however, section 152(b) bars federal preemption of
depreciation regulation.
136.
137.
138.
139.

106 S. Ct. at 1898.
Id. at 1902 n.5.
Id.
Id.

140. Id. at 1903.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1904.
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C.

The FCC Asks, "What Happened?"

The Louisiana Public Service Commission decision drastically diverges from the sweeping preemption authority the
FCC had previously enjoyed. As former FCC Common Carrier
Bureau Chief Phillip Verveer stated, the "[s]tates have lost
every fight over preemption for years and years, because a body
of law had been formed at the appellate level [affirming FCC
preemptions]. ' ' 43 Now, the Supreme Court "has fundamentally reordered the allocation of power between the federal
1' 44
government and the States.'
The Louisiana Public Service Commission decision represents a fundamental shift. The Court clearly rejected the notion that the FCC has unlimited power to preempt any state
action that contravenes federal telecommunications policy.
The Court held that the FCC's authority to set telecommunications policy is limited by the language of the statute, which expressly reserves to the states some authority.
Specifically, the decision rejects the reasoning in Computer
4
1
1 that preemption principles do not require
distinctions between states' ratemaking authority and other authority. In
Computer II the D.C. Circuit relied on NCUC 1146 in holding
that even the states' ratemaking authority must yield to valid
federal policy.147 Minimally, LouisianaPublic Service Commission rejects this analysis and denies FCC preemption power
when the power impinges on state ratemaking authority. The
Supreme Court decision focused closely on the role of depreciation practices in ratemaking. Since ratemaking is an exclusive
state power, federal preemption which directly impacts
ratemaking is improper. The issue now for the FCC and the
states is whether the Court's decision limits FCC preemption
power in non-ratemaking cases.
143.

TELECOM PUBLISHING GROUP, CAPITOL PUBLICATIONS, STATE TELEPHONE

7 (1986).
Id.
See supra notes 68-83 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.

REGULATION REPORT

144.
145.
146.
147.
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IV
Impact of Louisiana Public Service Commission
A.

$$$$$
The economic repercussions of the LouisianaPublic Service
Commission decision have been swift and sure. Telephone companies that had switched to the federal depreciation methods
from conflicting state practices generally had reaped greater
revenues as a result. However, most of the changes were contingent on the success of the FCC case on appeal. Now, with
the decision that state depreciation methods are improperly
displaced, the circuit courts, on remand, will order refunds to
telephone customers of the "ill-gotten" increased rates.
In Louisiana, the named state in the Supreme Court appeal,
the largest refund may be forthcoming. Louisiana Public Service Commission Secretary Louis Quinn stated that refunds re'148
lated to depreciation expense "could exceed $100 million.
An Arkansas Public Service Commission spokesperson roughly
estimated that Southwestern Bell might have to refund up to
twenty-eight million dollars in Arkansas. 14 9 An Ohio Public

Utilities Commission spokesperson estimated twenty million
dollars in refunds are forthcoming in that state. 150 "The immediate [e]ffect of [the] Supreme Court ruling allowing states to
determine their own intrastate depreciation rates may mean
state-ordered refunds to subscribers totalling at least $148 million, although some Wall Street analysts say the long-term effects of the decision could be even greater."'' Those additional
losses allegedly will result when telephone companies cannot
adequately recover costs through depreciation. The result is
that future investment in innovative technology will be cur52
tailed and service, in general, will suffer.1
148. TELECOM PUBLISHING GROUP, CAPITOL PUBLICATIONS, STATE TELEPHONE
REGULATION REPORT at 3-4.

149. Id. at 4.
150. Id. On October 1, 1986, this author received a $16.70 refund from Southwest-

ern Bell Telephone Company, pursuant to a Kansas Corporations Commission Order
reflecting reinstatement of Kansas depreciation practices in lieu of the federal
schedules.
151. Id. at 3.
152. Id. at 6.
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Legal Ramifications
1.

Radio paging services

The state versus federal power struggle was quickly reversed
in Louisiana Public Service Commission. Not only did the
FCC's string of preemption victories come to a halt, but two
other FCC preemption orders pending appeal on the date of
that decision have already fallen in the wake of the new
Supreme Court precedent.
On August 22, 1986, the FCC's order preempting state entry
regulation for licenses in the sub-FM frequencies was reversed
by the D.C. Circuit in Californiav. FCC.' Then, on September
22, 1986, the FCC requested that its order preempting state entry regulation of public mobile paging licensees be remanded
from the D.C. Circuit to avoid almost certain reversal after the
FM Subcarrierreversal.5
In both the California v. FCC and public mobile paging case,
the FCC sought to make paging services more competitive by
licensing multiple providers to use the FM radio subchannel or
public mobile radio bands, in order to provide paging services in
a given locale. Many states, however, had statutes that insured
155
monopolies in these services for the current service provider.
A federal licensee who sought to implement his federal license
in these states would be summarily denied the requisite state
authority to construct and operate anew, competing paging system. Subsequently, the federal license would lapse for
disuse.1 56
In both the California v. FCC and the public mobile paging
case, the FCC relied on its "general licensing" authority in
section 151 to support preemption of state regulation that
conflicted with federal telecommunications policy.1 57 Further153. California v. FCC, 798 F.2d 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1986). The FM radio spectrum is
divided into a main channel and subchannels. Formerly, the FM subchannels could be
used only for broadcast services. The FM subcarrier docket opened use of these subchannels to common carriers for non-broadcast services, such as paging. See id. at
1517.
154. National Assn. of Regulatory Util. Comm'n. v. FCC, No. 86-1205 (D.C. Cir.
Sept. 22, 1986).
155. See, e.g., Subsidiary Communications Authorizations (Paging Operations),
Amendment of Parts 2 and 73, Further Memorandum Opinion and Order, 57 Rad.
Reg. 2d (P & F) 1683, para. 3 (1985).
156. 47 C.F.R. § 22.43(a)(2)(1987). This section requires construction of the facility
to be completed within 12 months of federal authorization.
157. See, e.g., California v. FCC, 798 F.2d at 1517.

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L. J.

[Vol. 10:1

more, in both cases the FCC held that the section 152(b) limitation on its intrastate authority was "subject to the provisions of
section 301. ''l58 Section 301 directs the FCC "to maintain the
control of the United States over all channels of radio transmission."' 5 9 Thus, the Commission argued that despite a limitation
on its jurisdiction over rates, classifications, and charges in intrastate service, the FCC retained overarching jurisdiction regarding radio communications, including regulation of radio
licensees-both intrastate and interstate.
In these latest preemption attempts, as in Louisiana Public
Service Commission, the FCC could not rely heavily on its
favorable preemption precedents,1 6 ° which permitted preemption based on the interstate nature of the facilities.1 61 Paging
facilities using either FM subchannels or public mobile radio
bands usually are local services. 62 For this reason, the Commission relied on its general licensing authority in section 151
and its pervasive radio regulation authority in section 301. It
argued that state regulations that caused paging licensees to
forfeit licenses because of disuse were contrary to the FCC's
authority to establish competitive paging systems nationwide
through the use of multiple grants of paging licenses. 6 3
In Californiav. FCC, the California Public Utilities Commission argued that section 152(b) of the Act denied the Commission jurisdiction over paging, since it is an intrastate service.
158. Id. See also 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1982).
159. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1982).
160. See supra notes 36-83 and accompanying text.
161. The Supreme Court noted that the interstate nature of the services argument
had not been strongly pressed by the Commission because separation of interstate and
intrastate facilities for depreciation purposes was a long-standing practice. Louisiana
Pub. Serv. Comm., 106 S. Ct. 1890, 1902 (1986).
162. In the public mobile paging case, the FCC noted that many paging providers
were trying to provide "regional" paging systems, which would emit radio paging signals simultaneously in more than one state. These systems permit the customer to
carry only one pager, subscribe to only one paging service and still receive service in a
wide, multi-state territory. These providers complained that various restrictive state
regulatory schemes prohibited "interstate" services because the provider was often
denied state operating authority in one of the states in the regional system. See In the
Matter of Preemption of State Entry Regulation in the Public Land Mobile Service,
No. 85-89, paras. 5-6 (FCC March 31, 1986). The FCC preemption order, although citing these concerns, did not strongly rely on this "interstate" argument because most
of the paging regulation the FCC was preempting was regulation of strictly local paging service.
163. FM Subsidiary Communications Authorizations, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 55 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1607, para. 21 (1984).
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Thus, the, Commission had no authority to preempt.6
The FCC acknowledged that the states could continue to regulate rates, charges and services of providers in their states. 65
However, in this case, the FCC claimed it was only denying the
states the authority to regulate who could operate paging services in the' states.'6 6 Preemption over entry regulation, as opposed to rate regulation, was necessary to preserve the federal
radio licensing power.'6 7 Without such preemption, licensees
whom the FCC deemed appropriate or necessary service providers could be barred by the states from operating. A regulatory scheme based on the states' reading of section 152(b)
would prevent the FCC from effectuating its plan for efficient
use of the limited radio spectrum through competitive licensing, contrary to sections 151 and 301.168
The D.C. Circuit rejected the FCC's argument and reversed. 69 The court stated that "[t]he appropriate resolution of
this case is suggested in Louisiana Public Service Commission
v. FCC.'170 Although the court acknowledged that the
Supreme Court's decision limited the FCC preemption power
regarding "intrastate ratemaking authority,"' 71 it refused to
distinguish the subcarrier FM preemption on state entry regulation from the objectionable depreciation/ratemaking regulation in Louisiana Public Service Commission. The court
inferred that such a distinction defies logic.' 72 Despite the
FCC's assertion that its preemption action was limited enough
to satisfy section 152(b)'s limit on FCC jurisdiction, the court
said that the Commission's rationales for preemption suggested
"wholesale displacement of state regulation,"' 73 contrary to sec164.
165.
166.
167.

California v. FCC, 798 F.2d 1515, 1519 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
57 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) at para. 1.
Id. at para. 3.
55 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) at para. 21.

168. Id.
169. 798 F.2d at 1520.
170. Id. at 1518.

171. Id.
172. Id. at 1519.
173. Id. The three rationales for preemption that would result in "wholesale displacement of state regulation" are: (1) conflict with FCC licensing determinations; (2)
frustration of beneficial use of the radio spectrum; and (3) impediment to competition.
Id. at 1518. The court's concern for diminishing state regulatory power when the FCC
preempts entry regulation seems to ignore the fact that the identical scheme of limited preemption/limited state regulation is in place in the cellular mobile radio telephone industry today. See Amendments of Parts 2 and 22 of the Commissions Rules
Relative to Cellular Communications Systems, No. 79318, Reconsideration Order,

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L. J.

[Vol. 10: 1

tion 152(b).
The court also rejected the FCC's argument that the states'
authority in section 152(b) is subject to the FCC's broad radio
regulation authority in section 301. The court held that the statutory scheme of section 152(b) and section 301 indicates an intent to delegate jurisdiction of radio common carriage to the
17 4
states and to retain FCC jurisdiction over radio transmission.
Presumably, the court draws a distinction between the physical transmission of radio signals (FCC regulatory realm) and
the carrier who transmits the signals (states' regulatory realm).
5

17
To use the court's words, this differentiation defies logic.

How can the FCC regulate transmission if it does not have, at
least, the authority to designate who will so transmit? This
"entry" level licensing jurisdiction is all the FCC sought to
keep unfettered in both the California v. FCC and the public
mobile paging case. It appears consistent with section 301,
which allows the FCC to issue licenses for radio spectrum use.
Yet, the court effectively has denied the FCC final authority to
say who will transmit the radio signals, since the states now
have veto power over licensees. Under the court's scheme, the
FCC only has authority to regulate the radio transmissions of
state-approvedlicensees. Surely, the Supreme Court did not intend this result when it sought to protect the states' ratemaking
authority in Louisiana Public Service Commission.
The California v. FCC decision represents a dramatic swing
of the preemption pendulum from the D.C. Circuit's opinions
in NCUC I and Computer II, in which the court held that the
FCC could limit all state authority, including ratemaking authority, in pursuit of valid federal policy. Now, after the LouisianaPublic Service Commission reversal, the appellate bench
may be ready to handcuff the FCC in all areas of regulation of
intrastate services, including entry-level licensing decisions.
After the FCC's defeat in Californiav. FCC, reversal in the
public mobile paging case seemed imminent because the FCC's
action in the public mobile paging case was based onthe same
statutory scheme and construction as in California v. FCC.
Therefore, the FCC requested that its paging preemption order
para. 77-84 (FCC March 3, 1982). The same rationales for preemption of entry regulation in the cellular docket have not led the FCC to "justify preemption of additional
areas of State authority," in the cellular industry. California,798 F.2d at 1519.
174. 798 F.2d at 1519.
175. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
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on appeal be remanded from the D.C. Circuit.'7 6
Based on these facts and critical applications of the Louisiana Public Service Commission decision by the highly influential D.C. Circuit, it appears that section 152(b) will be viewed as
establishing total dual regulatory schemes. Subtle, though real,
distinctions between state entry regulation and on going regulation of the day-to-day activities of intrastate providers, such
as the rates they charge, will not support FCC preemption in
entry regulation, even though the Commission leaves rate regulation unscathed. Future telecommunications cases clearly
will be affected by this analytical twist.
2. Miscellaneous Telecommunications Preemption Issues
that May Require Rethinking
Several other telecommunications cases illustrate the impact
of the Supreme Court decision. At the time of the Louisiana
Public Service Commission decision, PacificBell v. FCC 77 was
pending appeal in the D.C. Circuit. The FCC had preempted
state regulation of the intrastate and intracity private lines of
the Crowley Maritime Company, based on connection of these
lines with the interstate network. Pacific Bell and others appealed. After Louisiana Public Service Commission, the FCC
moved (just as it did in the public mobile paging case) that the
Crowley case be remanded. The Commission said it "may not
have adequately addressed . . . issues in the case.' 7 Subsequently, the FCC vacated its Order. It asserted that the case
was moot because Crowley Maritime Company had obtained
79
elsewhere the service connections it sought from Pacific Bell.
The FCC has instituted a rulemaking docket to decide
whether to restrict state regulation of shared telephone lines in
office buildings or complexes. 8 0 This service commonly is
called shared-tenant service.' 8 ' Presumably, the states would
176. On March 30, 1987, the D.C. Circuit vacated the FCC's preemption order: "In
preempting state regulation of intrastate common carrier mobile services the Commission has exceeded its statutory authority." NARUC v. FCC, No. 86-1205 (D.C. Cir.
Mar. 30, 1987) (decision of Judges Wald, Bork and Ginsburg).
177. See Pacific Bell v. FCC, No. 85-1599 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
178. TELECOM PUBLISHING GROUP, CAPITOL PUBLICATIONS, STATE TELEPHONE
REGULATION REPORT at 8.

179. 1 F.C.C. Rcd. 362, para. 5 (1986).
180. 102 F.C.C.2d 1421 (1986).
181. In a shared-tenant system, occupants of a building, office complex or real estate development use telecommunications equipment located on the premises, and
connect to a shared PBX provided by the building owner or developer. Within the

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L. J.

[Vol. 10:1

oppose any limitation on their powers to regulate such services,
because the services are predominantly local and competition

would cut into the lucrative business subscriber revenues of the
local telephone companies. Those business revenues usually
subsidize residential telephone service. Thus, indirectly,
shared-tenant services impact decisions regarding rates charged
to individual subscribers. Faced with this line of argument,
which is now bolstered by the Louisiana Public Service Commission decision, the FCC probably would not attempt preemption in the shared-tenant services cases solely on the ground
that the services affect interstate communications because they
are interconnected to the national telephone network. The
FCC must overcome the states' argument that shared-tenant
services impact ratemaking and other day-to-day operational issues within the jurisdictional purview of the states.
In 1985, the FCC held that states cannot prohibit cable TV
firms from offering voice and data transmissions in competition
with local telephone companies. 8 2 Again, the FCC justified
preemption because the local cable facility is used for interstate
transmissions." 3 After LouisianaPublic Service Commission,
the FCC stated that the case was "in abeyance pending reconsideration." Presumably the FCC was concerned that an appeal
of the Order would mean reversal in light of the Supreme
84
Court decision.

These cases indicate that the FCC's plan would make the
telecommunications industry more competitive. However, competition means changing ratemaking and other practices by the
local service providers and their state regulatory bodies. The
Louisiana Public Service Commission decision will slow the
FCC course of action and may cause the FCC to use approaches
other than preemption of conflicting state action. Alternative
approaches could include amendment of section 152(b) of the
system, users can call without ever connecting to the local telephone company switch.
The entire shared system is linked to a telephone company's central office for calling
outside the system. The aggregated use of telephone company services requires fewer
lines (and resulting loss of revenue to the telephone company) than individual service
for each tenant on the system would require. Id. at 1422-23.
182. In the Matter of Cox Cable Communications, 102 F.C.C.2d 110, 111 (1985).
183. Id. at 122.
184.

TELECOM PUBLISHING GROUP, CAPITOL PUBLICATIONS, STATE TELEPHONE

REGULATION REPORT at 9. On November 12, 1986, the Commission vacated its Order.
As in the Crowley Maritime case, the Commission found the issues in Cox to be moot
because the petitioning carrier was no longer providing the service that was the basis
for the case.
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Communications Act and increased efforts at the state level to
conform state regulatory policy with federal policy. The FCC's
course over the next few years will not be as smooth as it was in
the two decades preceding 1986.

Conclusion
In Louisiana Public Service Commission, the Supreme
8 5
Court referred to historic preemption cases such as Hines
and Rice' 86 to set the legal framework for its decision.'87 The
Court explained that Congress can establish federal law as the
exclusive law of the land if the issues or areas of law warrant
it."" On the other hand, Congress can give federal and state
lawmakers concurrent jurisdiction, which the 1934 Congress
did in the telecommunications field. Once Congress so spoke,
this dual regulatory scheme was the law of the land in telecommunications. Thus, orders by the FCC that attempt to expand
FCC power beyond its delegated authority contravene the congressional statutory mandate. The depreciation orders which
led to the Louisiana Public Service Commission decision are
examples of excessive federal action.
However, California v. FCC also appears to contradict congressional intent. By failing to make a distinction between entry-level regulation and ratemaking and other day-to-day
regulation, which is the dual regulatory scheme described in
Louisiana Public Service Commission, the California v. FCC
decision may contravene congressional intent to give federal
regulators ultimate licensing authority. Further judicial interpretation or legislative action may be necessary to clarify the
parameters of federal and state telecommunications jurisdiction in this new competitive era.

185.
186.
187.
188.

See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
106 S. Ct. at 1898-99.
Id. at 1898.

